to, not to say contempt for, military art and soldierly training, to believe that a hundred thousand men, of their own race, with arms in their hands, animated by a genuine and exalted patriotism, could not without further delay be led to victory by a brave and energetic general The experience of Bull Run had been to a great degree forgotten. The difference between an army and a congeries of volunteer regiments was not appreciated.

It is certainly possible that much of this misunderstanding of the military situation might have been overcome if it had been practicable for the General-in-chief to declare his views respecting the needs of the army and his intentions respecting its employment. But this, as the slightest reflection shows, was entirely out of the question. General McClellan could not openly state that he had determined to retain his troops in their quarters until spring should render the roads practicable, or until all his regiments had enjoyed the advantage of several months of camp-life, for this would be to give Johnston an opportunity of aiding any of the other generals of the Confederacy who might for the time being need assistance. To keep as large a force of the enemy as was possible stationed quietly at Manassas was obvi-

ously desirable for the success of the expeditions to Beaufort, to Newberne, and to New Orleans; and therefore it would not do to permit any official or semi-official announcement of a postponement of active operations by the Army of the Potomac.

Hence McClellan, who never took any one, not even the President, into his confidence, was accused of in-